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"YOU CAN'T ALWAYS GET WHAT
YOU WANT": THE TERRITORIAL
SCOPE OF AN INDEPENDENT
QUEBEC©
BY PETER RADAN*
In Reference Re Secession of Quebec, the Court
identified Quebec's borders as a critical issue in any
secession negotiation. Canadian constitutional law
requires changes to existing borders, particularly if the
Aboriginal communities of Ungava maintain their
opposition to becoming part of an independent Quebec,
for three reasons. First, an independent Quebec has no
right to territory gained in 1898 and 1912 because those
territories were granted on the condition that Quebec
remain in the federation. Second, the existence of
constitutionally entrenched fiduciary obligations owed by
the Crown to Quebec's Aboriginal peoples gives the
latter a veto over a constitutional amendment that would
transform provincial borders into international borders.
Finally, the principle of federalism mandates that a
constitutional amendment affecting the sovereignty of
Aboriginal peoples, who comprise an effective third
sovereign tier in Canada's federal structure, requires the
consent of those Aboriginal peoples.
Dans son Rapport sur ta Secession du Qudbec, la
Cour qualifie la question des fronti~res du Qu6bec
d'616ment critique pour toute nfgociation concernant
une s6cession. Le droit constitutionnel canadien impose
des changements aux fronti~res existantes, pour trois
raisons, particuli rement si les communaut6s
autochtones d'Ungava continuent s'opposer faire
partie d'un Qu6bec ind6pendant. Premi6rement, un
Qu6bec ind6pendant n'a pas droit aux territoires acquis
en 1898 et en 1912, 6tant donn6 que ces territoires ont
6tc accord6s h la condition que le Qu(bec demeure dans
la f6deration. Deuxi~mement, les obligations fiduciaires
incorpor6es dans la constitution et accord6es par la
Couronne aux peuples autochtones du Qufbec donnent
A ces peuples un droit de veto sur tout amendement
constitutionnel qui transformerait des fronti6res
provinciales en fronti~res internationales. Enfin, le
principe du f6d6ralisme exige qu'un amendement
constitutionnel affectant la souverainet6 de peuple
autochtone, peuple qui constitue un troisi~me 6chelon
effectif de souverainet6 dans la structure f6d6rale du
Canada, nfcessite le consentement de ces peuples.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is an article of faith among the francophone secessionists of
Quebec that an independent Quebec would have the same territory as the
province of Quebec, which is guaranteed' to the province under Canadian
constitutional law.2 However, many people in Quebec vigorously dispute
this contention, including the Aboriginal communities in the Ungava
region3 of northern Quebec.4 Ungava is part of the traditional homeland to
a number of Quebec's Aboriginal peoples, such as the Cree and Inuit
peoples. It also accounts for approximately two-thirds of Quebec's present
Under the Constitution Act, 1871, (U.K.), 34 & 35 Vict., c. 28, s. 3 [Constitution Act, 1871]
Quebec's territorial limits can only be altered with its consent. Under s. 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Constitution Act, 1982] any alteration of
Quebec's borders with other provinces can only be achieved with the consent of its National Assembly.
2 The main pillar of support for this contention is the 1992 report of five international law experts
commissioned by the government of Quebec: T. Franck et al., "L'int6grit6 territoriale du Quebec dans
rhypoth~se de l'accession A la souverainet" in Commission d'dtude des questions affdrentes di laccession
du Qudbecti la souverainet6, LesAttributs d'un Qudbec souverain, Exposes et dtudes, vol. 1, 377, (Quebec:
Biblioth~que nationale du Qu6bec, 1992). This report relied heavily on the principle ofutipossidetisjuris
as applied to the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. For analysis of utipossidetis see Suzanne Lalonde,
Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World, The Role of Uti Possidetis (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2002) at 10; Peter Radan, The Breakup of Yugoslavia and International Law
(London: Routledge, 2002) at 69 [Radan, Breakup of Yugoslavia]; Tomas Bartog, "Uti Possidetis. Quo
Vadis?" (1997) 18 Austral. Y.B. Int'l L. 37.
3 Although there is uncertainty about the precise territorial scope of Ungava, for the purposes of
this article it includes the areas of northern Quebec that were the subject of Quebec border legislation
of 1898 and 1912. This legislation is discussed in more detail in Part 111, below.
Grand Council of the Crees, Sovereign Injustice, Forcible Inclusion of the James Bay Crees and
Cree Territory into a Sovereign Quebec (Nemaska: Grand Council of the Crees, 1995) at 171-217.
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territory. None of Ungava's Aboriginal communities have agreed to be part
of an independent Quebec. Rather, they insist that they cannot be
separated from Canada without their consent.5 These Aboriginal peoples
have consistently asserted that they have a legal right to remain within
Canada if and when Quebec becomes an independent state. The Cree have
also suggested that another option for them in this event is independent
statehood for the Aboriginal peoples.6 For an independent Quebec, the
practical implications of the Aboriginal peoples either staying in Canada
or seeking their own independence are the same: Quebec's independence
would result in new borders and a reduction of Quebec's territorial scope.
In short, a secession of Quebec would partition the province.
The aim of this article is to analyze, from the perspective of
Canadian constitutional law,7 the validity of the claims made by
francophone secessionists in Quebec, particularly in relation to Ungava. In
so doing, it is assumed that any future independence of Quebec will,
following the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference Re
Secession of Quebec,8 be the product of principled negotiations leading to
a constitutional amendment facilitating Quebec's legal secession from
Canada. 9 This article will argue that, should Quebec's Aboriginal peoples
5 Prior to the 1995 referendum on independence in Quebec, the James Bay Cree, the Inuit of
Nunavik, and the Innu each held referendums. In every case, over 95 per cent of those voting rejected
being separated from Canada without their consent. Claude-Armand Sheppard, "The Cree Intervention
in the Canadian Reference on Quebec Secession: A Subjective Assessment" (1999) 23 Vt. L. Rev. 845
at 851. The Inuit held a similar referendum at the same time as the 1980 referendum on independence
in Quebec: Grand Council of the Crees, supra note 4 at 317. The Inuit "have on four occasions, in four
separate referendums, overwhelmingly expressed their desire to remain within Canada and not to allow
themselves or the territory of Nunavik to be separated from Canada by a unilateral declaration of
independence by Quebec": Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Factum of the
Intervener Makivik Corporation at para. 2) [Makivik Factum]. See also Reference Re Secession of
Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Factum of the Intervener Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Estchee)
at paras. 8-9) [Cree Factum].
6 Grand Council of the Crees, supra note 4 at 66.
7 International law principles about the right of peoples to self-determination and utipossidetis
could also be relevant in determining an independent Quebec's borders. See Radan, Breakup of
Yugoslavia, supra note 2 at 204-43 (for an analysis of these principles and how they were applied to the
breakup of the former Yugoslavia); Lalonde, supra note 2 at 174-203.
8 [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 [Secession Reference].
9 In Secession Reference, ibid. at 267-70, the Court made it clear that there is no absolute legal
entitlement to secession in that, even if principled negotiations are held, agreement on a constitutional
amendment might not be reached. However, at 274-75, the Court conceded that an illegal unilateral
secession by Quebec might be recognized by the international community. This part of the Court's
decision has been seen as an implicit concession by the Court that such recognition would likely be
within Quebec's present provincial borders: Peter Radan, "The Supreme Court of Canada and the
Borders of Quebec" [1998] Austl. Int'l L.J. 171 at 174-75.
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continue to express clearly and democratically their collective will not to be
separated from Canada, such a constitutional amendment will be possible
only if the territorial scope of an independent Quebec is significantly
reduced from that of the present Canadian province. Most, if not all, of
Ungava would remain within Canada.
In Part II, this article will detail the emergence of the political and
legal debate within Canada about the borders of an independent Quebec.
Part III consists of a brief sketch of the historical development of Quebec's
current northern provincial border. Finally, Part IV will analyze the major
legal bases on which an independent Quebec would be denied the right to
retain most, if not all, of Ungava.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE DEBATE ABOUT QUEBEC'S
POST-SECESSION BORDERS
Only since the unsuccessful referendum on secession in 1995 have
territory and borders become significant questions in the debate about
secession. This significance derives from contributions of those Canadians
(including Quebecers) who oppose secession. Most, but not all, of these
Canadians believe that Quebec should be allowed to secede, but not with
its current borders. These "partitionists" reject the view of the former Parti
Qu~b~cois government of Quebec that its borders are inviolable. They
argue that if Canada's borders are not inviolable, then neither are
Quebec's. Thus, in 2003, Canada's minister for intergovernmental affairs,
Stephane Dion, wrote that "in the event that territorially concentrated
populations within Quebec clearly asked to stay attached to Canada, the
divisibility of Quebec's territory would have to be contemplated with the
same spirit of openness which led to accepting the divisibility of Canada's
territory."'" The partitionists, however, do not agree on how Quebec is to
be partitioned." On the other hand, partition of Quebec is not favoured by
10 Stephane Dion, "Democratic Governance and the Principle of Territorial Integrity," online:
The Minister < http://www.pco- bcp.gc.ca/aia/default.asp?Language= E&Page= minister&Sub=articles
&Doc=20030716_e.htm>. See also the statement by the 1995 Canadian foreign minister, Andre
Ouellet, quoted from S. Scott, "Ouellet questions whether borders would stay the same if Quebec
separates," The (Montreal) Gazette (20 September 1995); Patrick J. Monahan & Michael J. Bryant with
Nancy C. Cot6, Coming to Terms With Plan B: Ten Principles Governing Secession (Toronto: C. D. Howe
Institute, 1996) at 35 [Monahan & Bryant, Plan B]; Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law
and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at 160 [Franck, Fairness in International Law].
I See e.g. Lionel Albert & William F. Shaw, Partition: The Price of Quebec's Independence
(Montreal: Thornhill, 1980); David Varty, Who Gets Ungava? (Vancouver: Varty & Co., 1991); Scott
Reid, Canada Remapped: How the Partition of Quebec Will Reshape the Nation (Vancouver: Pulp Press,
1992); Grand Council of the Crees, supra note 4; Trevor McAlpine, The Partition Principle: Remapping
QuebecAfter Separation (Toronto: ECW Press, 1996); Monahan & Bryant, Plan B, ibid.; Richard Janda.
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all of those Canadians who oppose the secessionist movement. These
people argue that partition of Quebec is not practically feasible and that if
Quebec secedes it should be with its current provincial borders.12
A. The Secession Reference
In 1998, the issue of partition was raised by the Supreme Court of
Canada in its landmark decision in Secession Reference. One of the Court's
rulings was that the unilateral secession of Quebec from Canada would be
illegal under Canadian constitutional law.13 This decision does not mean
that the secession of Quebec from Canada is legally impossible. Rather, the
Court described "four fundamental and organizing principles" 14 of
Canada's constitution that could bring about a legal secession by
constitutional amendment if certain preconditions were satisfied. The four
principles are "federalism; democracy; constitutionalism and the rule of
law; and respect for minorities.' '15 These principles mandate that, after a
referendum in Quebec in which there is a "clear expression by the people
of Quebec 6 of their will to secede from Canada,"' 7 the federal government
and other provinces would be obliged to negotiate with Quebec to seek an
agreement on a constitutional amendment to facilitate Quebec's
secession. 8 Such a referendum would represent a "clear repudiation by the
people of Quebec of the existing constitutional order [that] would confer
legitimacy on the demands for secession."' 9 Any failure to reach an
agreement on an appropriate constitutional amendment would render
secession legally impossible.0
Dual Independence, The Birth of a New Quebec and the Re-birth of Lower Canada (Montreal: Varia Press,
1999).
12 Reed Scowen, Time to Say Goodbye. The Case for Getting Quebec Out of Canada (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1999) at 127; Robert A. Young, The Secession of Quebec and the Future of
Canada (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995) at 213-15.
13 Secession Reference, supra note 8 at 292-93.
1 4 Ibid. at 240.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid. at 237. It is clear that in its reference to the "people of Quebec" the Court meant the
population of Quebec.
1 7 Ibid. at 265.
18 Ibid. at 265, 294.
19 Ibid. at 266.
20 Ibid. at 263, 271, 273.
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The Court specifically acknowledged the importance of submissions
made by Aboriginal groups on the issue of "defining the boundaries of a
seceding Quebec with particular regard to the northern lands occupied
largely by Aboriginal peoples. 21 In its submissions, the James Bay Cree
asserted that a unilateral secession by Quebec would mean that,
Quebec would lose the guaranteed protection for its present administrative boundaries. [...1
the consent of the [Quebec] National Assembly to any constitutional change in its provincial
boundaries would have been effectively renounced. A seceding Quebec, if successful, would
only keep those portions of the present territory in the province over which it had
successfully managed to impose and maintain effective control.
22
The Inuit of Nunavik argued that their traditional homelands could form
part of an independent Quebec only if the Inuit consented. Otherwise, the
Canadian government had an obligation to preserve the integrity of the
Inuit's homelands.23
In light of these submissions the Court observed:
Negotiations following a referendum vote in favour of seeking secession would inevitably
address a wide range of issues, many of great import. After 131 years of Confederation, there
exists, inevitably, a high level of integration in economic, political and social institutions
across Canada. The vision of those who brought about Confederation was to create a unified
country, not a loose alliance of autonomous provinces. Accordingly, while there are regional
economic interests, which sometimes coincide with provincial boundaries, there are also
national interests and enterprises (both public and private) that would face potential
dismemberment. There is a national economy and a national debt. Arguments were raised
before us regarding boundary issues. There are linguistic and cultural minorities, including
Aboriginal peoples, unevenly distributed across the country who look to the Constitution of
Canada for the protection of their rights. Of course, secession would give rise to many issues
of great complexity and difficulty. These would have to be resolved within the overall
framework of the rule of law, thereby assuring Canadians resident in Quebec and elsewhere
a measure of stability in what would likely be a period of considerable upheaval and
uncertainty. Nobody seriously suggests that our national existence, seamless in so many
aspects, could be effortlessly separated along what are now the provincial boundaries of
Quebec.24
The Court also stated that in secession negotiations "aboriginal
interests would be taken into account.",2 Given the proximity of these two
passages, it is clear that "defining the boundaries" is one of the Aboriginal
interests to be considered at such negotiations. The inescapable implication
21 Ibid. at 288.
22 Cree Factum, supra note 5 at para. 114.
23 Makivik Factum, supra note 5 at paras. 24-26.
24 Secession Reference, supra note 8 at 269.
25 Ibid. at 288.
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of the Court's decision is that the partition of Quebec is possible.
B. The Clarity Act and Bill 99
Since the Secession Reference, most of the debate about secession
has focused on what majority referendum vote is needed to trigger the
negotiation process and on what would be a clear question to ask the voters
of Quebec. In Secession Reference, the Court indicated that the question
must be "free of ambiguity. '2 6 The Court also ruled that the political
process would determine what was a clear question. Margaret Moore
suggests this requirement "is justifiable both in terms of democratic
accountability and as a requirement of fairness."28 The federal government
of Canada took the initiative and in early 2000 passed the ironically named
Clarity Act. 9 The Act stipulates that, unless the House of Commons is
satisfied both that the referendum question is clearly worded 30 and that a
clear majority voted in favour of secession,31 the federal government has no
obligation to enter into constitutional negotiations. In the Secession
Reference, the Court expressly left the definition of "clear majority" to the
political process.3" During both the 1980 and the 1995 referendums on
secession, the Quebec provincial government maintained that a simple
majority vote in favour of secession was sufficient.33 The Court's judgment
26 Ibid. at 265.
27 Ibid. at 294.
28Margaret Moore, "The Ethics of Secession and a Normative Theory of Nationalism" (2000) 13
Can. J.L. & Jur. 225 at 247.
2 9 An Act to Give Effect to the Requirement for Clarity as Set Out in the Opinion of the Supreme Court
of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference, 2000, S.C. 2000, c. 26 [Clarity Act].
30 ClarityAct, ibid., s. 1. In the October 1995 referendum in Quebec the question asked was "Do
you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new
Economic and Political Partnership, within the scope of the Bill respecting the future of Quebec and
of the agreement signed in June 12,1995?" In a CROP Opinion Poll of August 1999, 36 per cent of
Quebecers thought this question was clear and 61 per cent of Quebecers thought it was not clear. The
same poll indicated that 93 per cent of Quebecers agreed that a question in a future referendum on
secession must be clear. Canada, Privy Council Office, Summary of the CROP Opinion Poll "Research
in Public Opinion", August 1999, online: <http://198.103.111.55/aia/docs/english/perspective/issues/
cropopinion.htm> (Privy Council commissioned public opinion poll conducted by the Centre de
recherche sur l'opinion publique) [CROP Opinion Poll].
Clarity Act, ibid., s. 2.
32 Secession Reference, supra note 8 at 294.
33 In August 1999, 37 per cent of Quebecers thought a simple majority vote was sufficient and 60
per cent of Quebecers thought it was not. At the same time, 70 per cent of Quebecers thought a 60 per
cent Yes vote would constitute a clear majority. CROP Opinion Poll, supra note 30.
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suggests that it did not accept this proposition. Furthermore, the federal
government has consistently asserted that a simple majority is not a clear
majority. Requiring more than a simple majority is "justifiable in terms of
establishing procedural barriers against too easy a right to exit that may
undermine the very basis of democratic politics. 34
In deciding whether the ClarityAct has been satisfied, the House of
Commons must consider the views of various political actors in Canada as
well as "any formal statements or resolutions by representatives of the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada," especially those in the province whose
government proposed the referendum on secession.35 The Clarity Act also
stipulates several items to be negotiated in the wake of a successful
referendum on secession." Two of those items are "changes to the borders
of the province" seeking to secede and the "rights, interests and territorial
claims of Aboriginal peoples of Canada."37
Within days of the federal Clarity Act, the Quebec government
responded by tabling Bill 99 in Quebec's National Assembly. The bill was
passed in December 2000.38 Apart from asserting that the wording of any
referendum question on secession is in the exclusive domain of Quebec's
political institutions and that a simple majority of votes cast is sufficient for
its approval,39 Bill 99 also stipulates that Quebec's borders cannot be
34 Moore, supra note 28.
35 Clarity Act, supra note 29, ss. 1(5), 2(3).
36 Ibid., s. 3(2).
37 In Secession Reference, supra note 8 at 288, the Court noted that in any secession negotiations
"Aboriginal interests would be taken into account." Janda suggests this implies that Aboriginal groups
would be represented at such negotiations. Janda, supra note 11 at 100. See also Paul Joffe, "Quebec
Secession and Aboriginal Peoples: Important Signals from the Supreme Court" in David Schneiderman,
The Quebec Decision, Perspectives on the Supreme Court Ruling on Secession (Toronto: James Lorimer
& Co., 1999) 137 at 139-40.
38An Act Respecting the Exercise of the Fundamental Rights and Prerogatives of the Quebec People
and the Quebec State, 2000, S.Q. 2000, c. 46 [Bill 99]. For strong criticism of an earlier version of Bill 99
see Bill 99:A Sovereign Act of Dispossession, Dishonour and Disgrace, Brief of the Grand Council of the
Crees (Eeyou Istchee) to the National Assembly Committee on Institutions, February 2000, online:
< http://www.gcc.ca/Political-Issues/bill_99.htm>.
Section 4 of Bill 99 is not in accordance with the clear majority requirement set out in the
Secession Reference. See Patrick J. Monahan, Doing the Rules, An Assessment of the Federal Clarity Act
in Light of the Quebec Secession Reference (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 2000) at 12-13; and Cristie
L. Ford, "In Search of the Qualitative Clear Majority: Democratic Experimentalism and the Quebec
Secession Reference" (2001) 39 Alta. L. Rev. 511 at 559. See generally Allen Buchanan, "Self-
Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law" in Robert McKim & Jeff McMahan, eds., The Morality
of Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) 301 at 315-16 (general comments rejecting
a simple majority vote in any secession referendum); Franck, Fairness in International Law, supra note
10 at 169. Compare Thomas Flanagan, "Should a Supermajority be Required in a Referendum on
Separation?" in John E. Trent, Robert Young & Guy Lachapelle, eds., Quebec-Canada, What is the Path
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altered without the consent of the National Assembly and that the
government of Quebec must ensure the territorial integrity of Quebec.4 Bill
99 does not, however, exclude the possibility of negotiated changes to
Quebec's borders.41 On this point there is no conflict between the relevant
provisions of the Clarity Act and Bill 99.
In negotiations involving the territory and borders of an
independent Quebec, the fate of Ungava will be a major focal point.42 Any
legal argument allowing Ungava to remain in Canada will feature
prominently in such negotiations.43 However, before analyzing these
arguments, an understanding of the historical development of Quebec's
current provincial borders is necessary.
III. HISTORY OF QUEBEC'S PRESENT NORTHERN BORDER
The Aboriginal populations in Ungava have occupied that land
from time immemorial. In 1670, England's King Charles II proclaimed the
land to be part of Rupert's Land. In the same proclamation, the Hudson's
Bay Company was incorporated and granted extensive commercial rights
over Rupert's Land.44 In 1713, under the Treaty of Utrecht,45 France
recognized British sovereignty over Rupert's Land.46 However, the exact
Ahead (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1996) at 129-34 (for arguments supporting a simple
majority).
40 Bill 99, supra note 38, s. 9.
41Legal experts advising Quebec's government have recently indicated that Quebec's borders
would be negotiable in the event of secession. See Paul Wells "Welcome to the post-separatist era"
National Post (29 March 2002) A8.
42 Quebec's anglophone community would likely make claims that areas in which it is the majority
population should be entitled to remain in Canada. The small anglophone Equality Party officially
endorses a policy of partition in the event of Quebec's departure from Canada. On Quebec's
anglophone community see Garth Stevenson, Community Besieged. The Anglophone Minority and the
Politics of Quebec (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999) at 225-29, 287-88.
43 In August 1999, 72 per cent of Quebecers thought that it would be reasonable if the majority
Aboriginal regions of northern Quebec remained in Canada. CROP Opinion Poll, supra note 30.
4 4 Royal Charter for Incorporating the Hudson's Bay Company, 2 May 1670, reprinted in Bernard
W. Funston & Eugene Meehan, Canadian Constitutional Documents Consolidated (Toronto: Carswell,
1994) at 64-74. As to the territorial extent of Rupert's Land pursuant to the Royal Charter see Kent
McNeil, Native Rights and the Boundaries of Rupert's Land and the North- Western Territory (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1982) at 7-12 [McNeil, Native Rights].
45 Treaty of Utrecht, 11 April 1713, reprinted in Fred L. Israel ed., Major Peace Treaties of Modern
History, 1648-1967 vol. 1 (New York: Chelsea House, 1967) at 177.
46 McNeil, Native Rights, supra note 44 at 17-19; Ren6e Dupuis & Kent McNeil, Canada's
Fiduciary Obligation to Aboriginal Peoples in the Context ofAccession to Sovereignty by Quebec, vol. 2
Domestic Dimensions (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1995) at 6.
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border between Ungava and the French colony of New France was never
clearly settled." In February 1763, pursuant to the Treaty of Paris,48 France
ceded New France to England. On October 7, 1763, by Royal
Proclamation, 49 King George III delimited the territory of Quebec." In
1774, the territorial scope of Quebec was increased by the Quebec Act,
1774.51 However, the QuebecAct, 1774 did not include Ungava in Quebec;
the northern border of Quebec remained the southern border of the
Ungava region of Rupert's Land.52 In 1791, Quebec was partitioned
creating Upper Canada, which was largely populated by English speakers,
and Lower Canada, which was largely populated by French speakers.53 In
1840, Upper and Lower Canada were reunited to form the Province of
Canada.54
In 1867, the Canadian federation was created by the Constitution
Act, 1867, which was known as the British North America Act, 1867"5 until
1982.56 Two of its provinces were Quebec and Ontario. These two provinces
corresponded to the former provinces of Lower and Upper Canada created
in 1791. 5' The Constitution Act, 1867, in section 146, contemplated the
future admission of Rupert's Land, and thus Ungava, to the Canadian
4 7 E. E. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company 1670-1870, Volume 1:1670-1763 (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1961) at 654-55.
48 Definitive Treaty of Peace, France, Great Britain, and Spain, 10 February 1763, 42 Cons. T.S.
279.
49 George R., Proclamation, 7 October 1763 (3 Geo. 1I1), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No.
1. See also Proclamation, 7 October 1763, reprinted in Funston & Meehan, supra note 44 at 75.
50 Norman L. Nicholson, The Boundaries of the Canadian Confederation (Toronto: Macmillan
Company of Canada, 1979) at 19-21.
(U.K.), 14 Geo. III, c. 83, art. I; Nicholson, ibid. at 23-24. Quebec's territorial scope in 1774
extended south and west to the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. The southern parts of Quebec were ceded
by the British to the United States of America under the terms of the Treaty of Paris of September 3,
1783, which ended the American War of Independence. The imprecise and ambiguous terminology of
the 1783 treaty necessitated protracted negotiations between the United States and Great Britain. The
Webster-Ashburton Treaty of August 9, 1942, finally settled the border between the United States and
British North America. On this process see Francis M. Carroll, A Good and Wise Measure: The Search
for the Canadian-American Boundary, 1783-1842 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
52 McNeil, Native Rights, supra note 44 at 45; Varty, supra note 11 at 12, 29.
53 ConstitutionalAct, 1791 (U.K.), 31 Geo. III, c. 31. art. 11; Nicholson, supra note 50 at 33-34.
54 Union Act, 1840 (U.K.), 3 & 4 Vict., c. 35, art. I; Nicholson, supra note 50 at 48-49.
55 British North America Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 [Constitution Act, 1867]; Nicholson,
supra note 50 at 57.
56 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1, s. 53(2).
57 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 55, s. 6.
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federation.58 On November 19, 1869, the Hudson's Bay Company
surrendered its rights in Rupert's Land to the British Crown on the basis
that Rupert's Land would be transferred to Canada. 9 In 1870, the British
Crown transferred Rupert's Land to Canada for 300,000 pounds, paid by
Canada to the Hudson's Bay Company.6° Subsequently, parts of Ungava
were given to Quebec through legislation enacted in 1898 and 1912. This
process, undertaken without consulting the Aboriginal populations of the
relevant territories, 61 tripled Quebec's territory and placed Aboriginal
populations in the added territory under the jurisdiction of Quebec for the
first time.
The border legislation of 1898 and 1912 was facilitated by section
2 of the Constitution Act, 1871,62 which made it clear that Canada's federal
parliament had the power to establish new provinces out of the former
Rupert's Land. Furthermore, the Constitution Act, 1871 enabled changes
in the territorial scope of a province.63
A. The 1898 Quebec Border Legislation
It is not clear whether the complementary border legislation of
1898, passed by Canada's federal parliament 64 and Quebec's provincial
assembly,65 expanded Quebec's territory by annexing part of Ungava or
whether it merely confirmed Quebec's territorial scope as at 1867. This
58 Rupert's LandAct, 1868 (U.K.), 31 & 32 Vict., c. 105 andAnActforthe Temporary Government
of Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory when United with Canada, 1869, S.C. 1869 (32 & 33
Vict.), c. 3, were enacted to facilitate the surrender of Rupert's Land to Canada.
59 Rupert's Land and North-Western Territory Order, 23 June 1870, Schedule C (as am. by Order of
Her Majesty in CouncilAdmitting Rupert's Land and the North- Western Territory into the Union, renamed
pursuant to Constitution Act, 1982,supra note 1, s. 53, Schedule, item 3) [Rupert's Land Order], reprinted
in Funston & Meehan, supra note 44 at 189.
60 Rupert's Land Order, ibid., art. 1.
61 Grand Council of the Crees, supra note 4 at 212-14; Douglas Sanders, "If Quebec Secedes From
Canada Can the Cree Secede From Quebec?" (1995) 29 U.B.C. L. Rev. 143 at 146.
62 Supra note 1.
63 Ibid., s. 3 ("The Parliament of Canada may from time to time, with the consent of the
Legislature of any Province of the said Dominion, increase, diminish, or otherwise alter the limits of
such Province, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the said Legislature, and may,
with the like consent, make provision respecting the effect and operation of any such increase or
diminution or alteration in relation to any Province affected thereby.")
6 4 An Act Respecting the North- Western, Northern and North-Eastern Boundaries of the Province of
Quebec, 1898, S.C. 1898, c. 3.
6 5 An Act Respecting the Delineation of the North-Western, Northern and North-Eastern Boundaries
of the Province of Quebec, 1898, S.Q. 1898, c. 6.
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uncertainty was reflected in the parliamentary debates about legislation to
expand Quebec in 1912. Parliamentarians from Quebec argued the
legislation merely confirmed an existing border, whereas their counterparts
from English Canada argued the legislation added part of Ungava to
Quebec.66 Although the border between Quebec and Rupert's Land in 1867
was that stipulated by the QuebecAct, 1774, the location of that border was,
and is, a matter of uncertainty.
The 1898 legislation on Quebec's borders, however, was part of the
clarification of the northern borders of Ontario and Quebec. In 1889,
Ontario's northern border was settled through the addition of territory to
that province. By virtue of the 1898 legislation, a similar amount of territory
was added to Quebec. 67 Kent McNeil suggests that the legislation was a
confirmation of an existing border between Rupert's Land and Quebec
because such a view accords with a ruling of the Privy Council in 1884 that
determined the northern border between Ontario and Rupert's Land as at
1867.68 Furthermore, in 1701 the Hudson's Bay Company was prepared to
accept the same border as that described in the 1898 legislation as its then
border with New France.69 However, McNeil notes that the Privy Council's
determination of the border between Canada and Labrador in 192771 is
consistent only with the view that the 1898 legislation amounted to an
extension of the territory of Quebec.7'
An analysis of the wording of the 1898 legislation does not reveal
whether it expanded or merely confirmed the northern border of Quebec.
There are a number of factors indicating that the legislation confirmed an
existing border rather than creating a new border. First, the federal
legislation stipulating the border is a declaration following an agreement
between the federal government and Quebec's provincial government.
There is no explicit statement that the legislation extends Quebec's borders.
Second, there is an absence of "terms and conditions" as required under
section 3 of the Constitution Act, 1871. Third, the title of the Quebec
66 House of Commons Debates, Vol. CVI (26 March 1912) at 6160-73 (Mr. Pugsley, Mr. Borden,
Mr. Lemieux, Mr. Charlton, Mr. Pelletier); Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Nations and Qu6bec's
Boundaries: Canada Couldn't Give What It Didn't Have" in Daniel Drache & Roberto Perin, eds.,
Negotiating With a Sovereign Quibec (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1992) 107 at 111.
67 Nicholson, supra note 50 at 104-107.
68 Ontario Boundaries Case (1884) Imp. P.C. This decision is not reported. See McNeil, Native
Rights, supra note 44 at 20-33 (for an account of the case and its background).
69 Nicholson, supra note 50 at 104.
70 Re Labrador Boundary, [1927] 2 D.L.R. 401 (P.C.).
71 McNeil, Native Rights, supra note 44 at 45-47.
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provincial legislation refers to "delimitation of [...] boundaries." Finally,
in the federal parliamentary debates, the minister responsible for the
legislation stated its purpose as one of "ratifying a conventional boundary
on the north and north-east of the province of Quebec."7 All of these
factors seem to indicate that the 1898 legislation confirmed part of
Quebec's existing northern border.
On the other hand, the preambles to both the federal and provincial
legislation state that the legislation exists pursuant to the Constitution Act,
1871, which, in section 3, stipulates that the federal Parliament can, with
the consent of a province, "increase, diminish, or otherwise alter the limits"
of such a province. This provision is only concerned with changing the
territorial configuration of a province and not with determining an existing
border between Canada's territorial units. Because the 1898 legislation was
enacted on the basis of section 3 of the Constitution Act, 1871, it follows
that the legislation changed the territorial configuration of Quebec, in this
case by increasing its territory. Under this interpretation of the legislation,
its references to an agreement between the federal and Quebec
governments simply referred to, and confirmed, compliance with the
requirement for such an agreement in section 3 of the Constitution Act,
1871. The declaration in the legislation is a declaration of an agreement
extending Quebec's territory, not a declaration confirming an existing
border.
B. The 1912 Quebec Border Legislation
Whatever the case may have been in 1898, it is clear that the 1912
legislation extended Quebec territorial reach by adding territory from
Ungava. The federal73 and provincial74 legislation explicitly refer, both in
their titles and substantive parts, to an expansion of Quebec's borders. The
territory added to Quebec never belonged to the colony of New France or
to Quebec as it existed prior to Confederation. This territory was clearly
within sovereign British territory following the Treaty of Utrecht.75
What emerges from this analysis of the 1898 and 1912 legislation is
72 House of Commons Debates, Col. XLVII (2 June 1898) at 6746 (Mr. Sifton).
73 The Quebec Boundaries Extension Act, 1912, S.C. 1912, c. 45, s. 2.
74 An Act respecting the extension of the Province of Quebec by the annexation of Ungava, S.Q. 1912,
c. 7, s. 1 [Extension of Quebec Act].
75 McNeil argues that the British never had sovereignty overwhat is now most of northern Quebec
because they did not have effective occupation and control over that territory. See Kent McNeil,
Emerging Justice: Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre,
University of Saskatchewan, 2001) at 1-24 [McNeil, Emerging Justice].
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that the legislation added Ungava to the territory that Quebec held in 1867.
However, it is unclear whether the additional territory was granted to
Quebec solely pursuant to the 1912 legislation or as the result of a two-
stage process including the 1898 and 1912 legislation. This is a crucial issue
because the first argument to be presented below will suggest that an
independent Quebec has no legal claim to Ungava territory granted to
Quebec by Canada after 1867. Therefore, the issue of whether this territory
includes only that added by the 1912 legislation or whether it also includes
territory covered by the 1898 legislation is of immense practical significance
in determining the borders of an independent Quebec.
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST UNGAVA REMAINING
PART OF AN INDEPENDENT QUEBEC
Three lines of argument justifying the partition of Quebec in the
event of secession are discussed below. Each argument gives effect to the
claims of the Aboriginal peoples of Ungava that their traditional homelands
should remain part of Canada. The first stems from the purpose and legal
basis of the addition of the Ungava territory to Quebec. The second stems
from the Crown's constitutionally imposed fiduciary obligations owed to
Canada's Aboriginal peoples. The third stems from Canada's federal
structure and the nature of Canadian federalism.
A. The Purpose and Legal Basis of the Addition of Ungava to Quebec
Quebec was not the only province to expand its borders in 1912;
Ontario76 and Manitoba" also gained more territory. Parliamentary debates
and other records of the time clearly indicate that these territorial
extensions did not compensate the provinces for any territorial claims they
may have had to the territories gained but, rather, enabled the provinces to
better develop as provinces, thereby unifying the Canadian federation.7"
The Manitoba extension, for example, was completed explicitly to preserve
geographical symmetry and equality between the provinces, which was
deemed essential for the purposes of Canadian federalism.7 9 Canada also
76 The Ontario Boundaries Extension Act, S.C. 1912, c. 40.
77 The Manitoba Boundaries Extension Act, 1912, S.C. 1912, c. 32.
78 Grand Council of the Crees, supra note 4 at 208-209.
79 Ibid. at 209-10; Nicholson, supra note 50 at 195,207; Steven R. Ratner, "Drawing a Better Line:
Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States" (1996) 90 A.J..L. 590 at 603.
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wanted each of these provinces to have access to Hudson's Bay.8°
David Varty has argued that "[t]he sole basis of the transfer of
jurisdiction to Ungava was Quebec's status as a province. The continuation
of Quebec's status as a province was an implied condition of transfer."'"
Similarly, Stephen Scott has argued that the purpose of the expansion of
Quebec was related solely to its function as a province.82
It is reasonable to speculate that in 1912 the legislators in Canada's
federal parliament would not have contemplated that the borders then
being created might become the borders of an independent Quebec.83 If
secession had been contemplated, different borders would undoubtedly
have resulted. The same argument can be made about the legislation of
1898, if it was an extension, rather than a mere confirmation, of Quebec's
territorial scope. Thus, the constitutional protection of Quebec's borders
is contingent on it remaining part of the Canadian federation. If Quebec
secedes from Canada it is not entitled to retain the territory it gained over
and above what it had in 1867 as a result of the 1898 and 1912 border
legislation. Quebec cannot insist upon enforcing a protection contained in
a constitution that it is otherwise prepared to reject. As Steven Ratner aptly
80 Grand Council of the Crees, supra note 4 at 209; Nicholson, supra note 50 at 143-44.
81 Varty, supra note 11 at 29.
82 Stephen A. Scott, "October 1992: Issue Relating to Quebec Independence" (Remarks at a
Public Meeting, Holiday Inn, Pointe Claire, Quebec, 19 February 1992) (Montreal: Stephen A. Scott,
1992) at 24 ("These territories [...] were attached to Quebec by the federal Parliament to form part of
a Canadian province, - Quebec, - and to be governed, by the institutions of that province, as a province
and within its constitutional powers as such. Not for any other purpose."). See also David Jay Bercuson
& Barry Cooper, Deconfederation: Canada Without Quebec (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1991) at 151-
52; Peter Russell & Bruce Ryder, "Ratifying a Postreferendum Agreement on Quebec Sovereignty" in
David Cameron ed., The Referendum Papers: Essays on Secession and National Unity (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1999) 323 at 341-42; and Malcolm N. Shaw, "The Heritage of States: The
Principle of UtiPossidetisJuris Today" (1996) 67 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 75 at 117. Shaw notes that internal
borders "are not intended to constitute permanent boundaries. Nor are they protected as such under
international law. They are created and exist solely under municipal law." A similar approach to internal
borders was taken by the leadership of post-World War II Yugoslavia following the introduction of a
federal structure to that country. Radan, Breakup of Yugoslavia, supra note 2 at 152-53.
83 Peter W. Hogg, "Principles Governing the Secession of Quebec" (1997) 8 N.J.C.L. 19 at 43
[Hogg, "Secession of Quebec"]. In the context of administrative borders within Spanish Latin America
prior to the independence movement in the early nineteenth century, the International Court of Justice
has remarked that "no question of international boundaries could ever have occurred to the minds of
those servants of the Spanish Crown who established administrative boundaries." The Court described
the transformation of colonial administrative borders into international borders as "investing as
international boundaries administrative limits intended originally for quite other purposes." See Case
Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua
intervening), [1992] I.C.J. Rep. 350 at 388. According to one of the most senior leaders of the time,
Milovan Djilas Yugoslavia's, internal borders established after World War II were never intended to
be international borders. See David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (London: Victor Gollancz, 1995) at 34-35.
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puts it, Quebec secessionists cannot "have their cake and eat it, too. ' ' 4
B. Canada's Fiduciary Obligations Owed to Aboriginal Peoples
The second basis on which it can be argued that Quebec cannot
achieve independence with its present borders is the Crown's fiduciary
obligations towards Aboriginal peoples. This argument requires the
establishment of two propositions: the existence of a fiduciary obligation
owed to Aboriginal peoples by the Crown and the scope of the obligation
legally requiring the consent of Quebec's Aboriginal peoples to a proposed
constitutional amendment.
1. The existence of a fiduciary obligation
The existence of a fiduciary obligation depends on the scope of
either or both of Aboriginal or treaty rights held in Ungava and on the law
of constitutionally imposed fiduciary obligations owed to Aboriginal
peoples.
a. Aboriginal and/or treaty rights in Ungava
A significant source of the rights of Aboriginal peoples in Ungava
is the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) of 1975. The
roots of the JBNQA can, in part, be traced to Rupert's Land Order.85 By the
terms of this order, Rupert's Land, of which Ungava was a part, and the
North-Western Territory became part of Canada on July 15, 1870.86 The
transfer of these territories to Canada was on certain terms and conditions.
Article 14 stipulated: "Any claims of Indians to compensation for lands
required for purposes of settlement shall be disposed of by the Canadian
Government in communication with the Imperial Government; and the
[Hudson's Bay] Company shall be relieved of all responsibility in respect of
them., 87 This provision clearly acknowledged that the "Indians" had land
claims in Rupert's Land before 1870 and transferred responsibility for their
84 Ratner, supra note 79 at 607.
85 The Aboriginal rights of the peoples of Ungava are not dependent on the existence of Rupert's
Land Order. The Court has held that they are inherent rights not dependent on any executive order or
legislative enactment. Paul Joffe, "Assessing the Delgamuukw Principles: National Implications and
Potential Effects in Quebec" (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 155 at 181.
8 6 Rupert's Land Order, supra note 59. See McNeil, Emerging Justice, supra note 75 at 326-30 (on
the background to this order).
8 7 Rupert's Land Order, ibid., art. 14.
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settlement to the Canadian government.
Furthermore, in a joint address of the Canadian Senate and House
of Commons on May 28, 1869, which was attached to Rupert's Land Order,
a protective provision provided that "upon the transference of the
territories in question to the Canadian government it will be our duty to
make adequate provision for the protection of the Indian tribes whose
interests and well-being are involved in the transfer. 8 8 Although this
protective provision was not contained in the terms of the order itself, but
rather in a schedule to the order, the British Crown approved the joint
address, as is explicitly stated in the order's preamble. Therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that the schedule has the same constitutional force
as the order itself.89 When Canada assumed jurisdiction over the territories
subject to Rupert's Land Order, the British government transferred the
existing rights and duties owed to the Aboriginal peoples in those territories
to the federal government of Canada9" because the federal government, by
the terms of subsection 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 had exclusive
legislative competence over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians."
In Reference Re Eskimo, a unanimous Court found the word "Indians" to
mean all Aboriginal peoples in Canada as at 1867 and in those territories
that, in 1867, were anticipated to become part of Canada. 91 This latter
category includes the Aboriginal peoples of Ungava.
McNeil suggests that the scope of the "interests" protected by
Rupert's Land Order "should be construed broadly to include any interests
that tribes might have, including, economic, social, cultural and political
interests" and that "the protection relates to the Indian tribes' cultural and
political existence as nations."92
In 1912, pursuant to section 2 of the federal legislation extending
its territorial scope, Quebec assumed partial responsibility for Aboriginal
interests in the territory it gained as a result of the 1912 border legislation.
In particular, subsection 2(c) of the federal legislation as adopted by
Quebec, 93 obliged Quebec to "recognize the rights of Indian inhabitants in
the territory" and to "obtain surrenders of such rights" in the same manner
88 ]bid., Schedule B.
89 Dupuis & McNeil, supra note 46 at 27-28; McNeil, EmergingJustice, supra note 75 at 331-32.
90 BakerLake (Hamlet) v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, [1980] 1 F.C. 518
at 566 (T.D.); McNeil, Emerging Justice, ibid. at 330.
91 [1939] S.C.R. 104.
92 McNeil, Emerging Justice, supra note 75 at 335.
93 The provisions of s. 2(c) were adopted by Quebec pursuant to the Extension of QuebecAct,supra
note 74, s. 1.
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as the Government of Canada had "recognized such rights" and "obtained
surrender[s] thereof' to that date.
The enactment of subsection 2(c) raises two issues. The first issue
is whether or not the federal delegation of power to Quebec was
constitutionally valid. Generally, it is unconstitutional for the federal
government to confer its exclusive legislative power under subsection
91(24) on a provincial government.94 Therefore, subsection 2(c) was of no
effect and the federal government retained its exclusive legislative
competence granted by subsection 91(24) and remained solely responsible
for the obligations imposed on it by Rupert's Land Order. Alternatively,
however, it may be that these obligations became the joint responsibility of
the federal and Quebec governments in the territory subject to the 1912
border legislation. In either case, the federal government remained bound
by its obligations to the Aboriginal peoples in that territory after 1912.
The second issue raised by subsection 2(c) relates to the meaning
of "rights" in that provision. The rights referred to in subsection 2(c) were
not set out in the legislation. It could be argued that these rights are
identical to the "interests" recognized by the Canadian government in the
protective provision appended to Rupert's Land Order. However, it is also
possible that "rights" has a narrower meaning than "interests." This issue
is only significant if subsection 2(c) resulted in the joint responsibility of the
federal and Quebec governments for obligations owed to Aboriginal
peoples in the territory subject to the 1912 border legislation. If "rights"
and "interests" are identical, then the responsibility of the federal and
Quebec governments was co-extensive. If "interests" is a broader concept
than "rights" then the federal responsibility was broader in scope than that
of Quebec.
The expansion of Quebec in 1912 markedly increased controversy
between Ungava's Aboriginal peoples and the Quebec government.
Generally, the latter ignored its responsibilities to Aboriginal peoples while
it pursued policies of economic development and resource exploitation in
the newly acquired territories.9" The federal government, during this period
and until the 1970s, was similarly neglectful of its obligations to the
Aboriginal peoples.96
9 4 Nova Scotia (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), [1951] S.C.R. 31. For a discussion of the so-called inter-
delegation rule see Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf, vol. 1 (Scarborough:
Carswell, 1999) at 14-14 - 14-23 [Hogg, Constitutional Law].
95Sparrow v. The Queen, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1103-1104 [Sparrow].
96Glen St. Louis, "The Tangled Web of Sovereignty and Self-Governance: Canada's Obligation
to the Cree Nation in Consideration of Quebec's Threats to Secede" (1996) 14 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 380
at 383-84.
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The federal government's neglect of its obligations towards the
Aboriginal peoples of Ungava allowed the Quebec provincial government
to extend provincial services and programs into Ungava during the 1960s
and led to a belief that provincial authorities could act essentially
unilaterally to develop Ungava. Thus, in November 1971, Premier Robert
Bourassa announced plans for a massive hydroelectric project in the James
Bay area. This announcement galvanized Ungava's Aboriginal peoples,
especially the Cree, into legal action opposing the development. In
November 1973, the Quebec Superior Court granted an injunction halting
the development based on claims that the development would violate
Aboriginal rights and culture.97 Although the injunction was suspended one
week later, 8 it was clear to all parties that such a development could not
proceed on a wholesale denial of Aboriginal rights.99 Thereafter, a two-year
period of negotiations culminated in the JBNQA of November 11, 1975.1"°
The federal government, the Quebec government, the James Bay Energy
Corporation, the James Bay Development Corporation, Quebec
Hydroelectric Commission, the Grand Council of the Crees, and the
Northern Quebec Inuit Association were all parties to the JBNQA. l0 ' In
1978, the Northeastern Quebec Agreement amended the JBNQA by adding
the Naskapi Indians of Quebec as a party.0 2 Section 1.16 of the JBNQA
stipulated that the territory to which the JBNQA applied was that which was
subject to the Quebec border legislation in 1898 and 1912.
One effect of the JBNQA was to clarify Quebec's obligations under
the 1912 legislation to the Aboriginal populations in the territory that was
subject to the JBNQA. Prior to 1975, these obligations had "remained
undefined."'0 3 Section 1 of the JBNQA states that "Quebec now wishes to
fully satisfy all of its obligations with respect to the Native people inhabiting
the Territory." 114 In achieving this goal, the non-Aboriginal parties to the
9 7 Le Chef Max "One-Onti" Gros-Louis c. La Socidtdide dveloppement dela Baie James, [1974] R.P.
38.
98 La Socidtd de ddveloppement de la Baie James c. Chef Robert Kanatewat, [1975] C.A. 166.
99 Paul Rynard, "'Welcome In, But Check Your Rights at the Door': The James Bay and Nisga'a
Agreements in Canada" (2000) 33 Canadian Journal of Political Science 211 at 215-16.
100 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, 11 November 1975 [JBNQA].
The Cree have consistently maintained that their agreement to the JBNQA was obtained under
duress: Grand Council of the Crees, supra note 4 at 249-62.
102 Dupuis & McNeil, supra note 46 at 34-35.
103 Cree RegionalAuthority v. Canada (FederalAdministrator) (1991), 81 D.L.R. (4th) 659 at 662
(F.C.A.).
104 JBNQA, supra note 100, s. 1.
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agreement agreed to "give, grant, recognize and provide" to the Aboriginal
parties to the agreement certain "rights, privileges and benefits" set out in
the agreement. 05 In return, the agreement's Aboriginal parties agreed to
"cede, release, surrender and convey all their Native claims, rights, titles
and interests, whatever they may be" to Canada and Quebec.1"6 Under
section 2.15, the JBNQA can only be amended with the consent of all
parties.
The JBNQA was implemented federally by the James Bay and
Northern Quebec Native Claims SettlementAct °7 and provincially by the Act
Approving the Agreement Concerning James Bay and Northern Quebec.l"8 An
important provision of the James Bay Act is section 3. In accordance with
section 2.6 of the JBNQA, subsection 3(3) of the James BayAct provides that
"[a]ll native claims, rights, title and interests, whatever they may be, in and
to the Territory, of all Indians and all Inuit, wherever they may be, are
hereby extinguished."'°9 Through subsection 3(2) the "rights, privileges and
benefits" accorded to the Aboriginal parties to the JBNQA came into effect
simultaneously with subsection 3(3). The "rights, privileges and benefits"
gained pursuant to the JBNQA are summarized in the Preamble to the James
BayAct as follows:
[Tihe JBNQA provides, inter alia, for the grant to or setting aside for Crees and Inuit of
certain lands in the Territory, the right of the Crees and Inuit to hunt, fish and trap in
accordance with the regime established therein, the establishment in the Territory of regional
and local governments to ensure the full and active participation of the Crees and Inuit in
the administration of the Territory, measures to safeguard and protect their culture and to
ensure their involvement in the promotion and development of their culture, the
establishment of laws, regulations and procedures to manage and protect the environment
in the Territory, remedial and other measures respecting hydro-electric development in the
Territory, the creation and continuance of institutions and programs to promote the
economic and social development of the Crees and Inuit and to encourage their full
participation in society, an income support program for Cree and Inuit hunters, fishermen
and trappers and the payment to the Crees and Inuit of certain monetary compensation."'
The Preamble to the James Bay Act also provides that "the
Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec have assumed
105 Ibid., s. 2.2.
106 Ibid., s. 2.1.
107 S.C. 1976-77, c. 32. [James Bay Act].
108 S.Q. 1976, c. 46. For a critical account of the implementation of the JBNQA see Paul Rynard,
"Ally or Colonizer?: the federal State, the Cree Nation and the James Bay Agreement" (2001) 36:2 J.
Can. Stud. 8.
10 9 James BayAct, supra note 107, s. 3(3).
110 Ibid., Preamble.
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certain obligations under the [JBNQA] in favour of the [...] Crees and
Inuit."'' This provision makes it clear that both governments have
responsibilities, as set out in detail in the JBNQA, with respect to delivering
the "rights, privileges and benefits" referred to in subsection 3(2) to the
Aboriginal parties to the JBNQA. One of the significant federal government
responsibilities, pursuant to section 9 of the JBNQA, was the establishment
through federal legislation of local government for the Cree and the
Naskapi. This was done in 1984 by virtue of the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec)
Act.
112
In addition to the said rights, privileges, and benefits, the James Bay
Act indicates a further, more general, responsibility to the Aboriginal
parties. This responsibility is made clear in the Preamble, which provides
that "the Parliament and the Government of Quebec recognize and affirm
a special responsibility" for the Aboriginal parties.1 3 This provision must
be read in the context of section 7 of the James Bay Act which, pursuant to
section 2.5 of the JBNQA, repealed section 2 of the 1912 border legislation
and removed whatever obligations Quebec had pursuant to that legislation,
if any, towards the Aboriginal peoples of Ungava. As noted above, the 1912
legislation may have resulted in Canada and Quebec being jointly
responsible for the Crown's obligations towards the Aboriginal peoples of
Rupert's Land. The effect of section 7 of the James Bay Act was to restore
sole responsibility for these obligations to Canada's federal government and
Parliament. The Preamble to the James Bay Act, in its recognition and
affirmation of a federal government "special responsibility," effectively
acknowledged this result." 4
b. The fiduciary obligations of the Crown
Given the existence of Aboriginal rights as set out in the JBNQA, it
must be established that the Crown owes fiduciary obligations to the
Aboriginal peoples of Ungava with respect to those rights. Such fiduciary
obligations can be established in at least two ways.
First, the effect of the JBNQA, and of the federal and Quebec
legislation implementing it, is to impose fiduciary obligations on the part of
both the federal and Quebec governments towards the Aboriginal peoples
Ibid.
112 Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act, 1984, S.C. 1984, c. 18.
113 James Bay Act, supra note 107, Preamble.
114 Grand Council of the Crees, supra note 4 at 357.
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party to the agreement. In Guerin v. The Queen," 5 the Court ruled that
where an Aboriginal group surrenders its interest in land to the Crown,
fiduciary obligations are owed by the Crown to that Aboriginal group.'1 6
Justice Dickson explained that the mere fact that Aboriginal groups have
an interest in land does not give rise to the Crown's fiduciary obligations.
Rather, they arise because Aboriginal interests are inalienable except by
surrender to the Crown. Justice Dickson concluded,
An Indian band is prohibited from directly transferring its interest to a third party. Any sale
or lease of land can only be carried out after a surrender has taken place, with the Crown
then acting on the band's behalf. The Crown first took this responsibility upon itself in the
Royal Proclamation of 1763. [...I The surrender requirement, and the responsibility it
entails, are the source of a distinct fiduciary obligation owed by the Crown to the Indians.'
1 7
In Cree Regional Authority v. Canada (Federal Administrator),18
Justice Rouleau confirmed that the surrender of land pursuant to the
JBNQA generates a fiduciary duty. He ruled that the federal government
assumed fiduciary obligations to the Cree and Inuit by extinguishing rights
pursuant to the federal act implementing the JBNQA. Justice Rouleau
pointed out that "[iun light of the fiduciary obligation imposed upon the
federal government in its dealing with the native population [...] the
Agreement mandates the protection of the Aboriginal people who
relinquished substantial rights in return for the protection of both levels of
government."... 9 Given that pursuant to section 2.1 of the JBNQA rights were
surrendered to both Canada and Quebec, the fiduciary obligations that flow
from such surrenders would be imposed on both the federal and the
Quebec provincial governments.
A second way in which the Crown's fiduciary obligations can be
established is under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Subsection
35(1) stipulates that "[tlhe existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the
Aboriginal peoples are hereby recognized and affirmed."'121
In Sparrow,'2' the Court ruled that the words "recognized and
affirmed" in subsection 35(1) imposed fiduciary obligations on the Crown
115 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 [Guerin].
116 Ibid. at 376.
117 Ibid.
118 (1992), 84 D.L.R. (4th) 53 (F.C.T.D.).
119 Ibid. at 74-75. This decision was followed in Lord c. Canada (Procureurgdndral), [1999] J.Q.
No. 5413 (C.S.).
120 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1, s. 35(1).
121 Sparrow, supra note 95.
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with respect to any legislation affecting Aboriginal and treaty rights. 122 The
Court stated that the "guiding principle" for subsection 35(1) is that "the
Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect
to Aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the Government and
Aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary
recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal rights must be defined in light of
this historic relationship. 123 The Court stated that the Crown's obligations
pursuant to subsection 35(1) stemmed from the fiduciary obligations
referred to in Guerin and the principle stated in R. v. Taylor 124 that, in its
dealing with the Aboriginal peoples, "the honour of the Crown is always
involved and no appearance of 'sharp dealing' should be sanctioned."
' 25
Although Sparrow dealt with the fiduciary obligations of federal
authorities, the Court stated that subsection 35(1) also afforded Aboriginal
peoples constitutional protection from the exercise of provincial power.
126
Subsequent Court rulings have affirmed that subsection 35(1) governs
provincial authorities.
1 21
Subsection 35(3) makes it clear that the treaty rights referred to in
subsection 35(1) include rights that exist pursuant to land claim
agreements. Thus, Aboriginal treaty rights impose fiduciary obligations on
the Crown. Furthermore, there is authority placing the JBNQA within the
scope of subsection 35(3), thereby imposing on the Crown fiduciary
obligations respecting the treaty rights created by the agreement.1 28
However, this has not been affirmed by the Court.
It must be recognized that the federal and Quebec governments
have claimed that the JBNQA is not a treaty. 129 However, even if it is not a
treaty, there is authority from the Court suggesting that the fiduciary
obligations in subsection 35(1) arise "by analogy," 131 irrespective of the type
122 Ibid. at 1109.
123Ibid. at 1108.
124 (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 360 (C.A.), MacKinnon A.C.J.O.
125 Ibid. at 367. See also R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 at 793-94, Sopinka J. [Badger]; R. v.
Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 at 496-98 [Marshall].
126 Sparrow, supra note 95 at 1105.
127Badger,supra note 124; R. v. Cote, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 at 185;Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at 1107 [Delgamuukw]; and R. v. Sundown, [1999]1 S.C.R. 393.
12 8 Eastmain Band v. Gilpin [1987] 3 C.N.L.R. 54 at 66-67 (Que. Prov. Ct.); Cree School Board v.
Canada (A.G.), [1998] 3 C.N.L.R. 24 (Que. S.C.) [Cree School Board]; Lord v. Quebec (A.G.) [2000] 3
C.N.L.R. 78 at 100 (Que. S.C.).
129 See e.g. submissions in Cree School Board, ibid. at 24.
130 See Badger, supra note 125.
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of document creating the relationship between the two. Fiduciary
obligations "arise out of the nature of the relationship between the Crown
and Aboriginal peoples" 3' and not as a consequence of the characterization
of an agreement between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. Therefore,
the Crown owes a fiduciary obligation to the Aboriginal peoples in Ungava.
2. The nature of the Crown's fiduciary obligations
Although the existence of fiduciary obligations is clear, whether or
not these obligations legally require the consent of Aboriginal peoples in
Ungava depends on three questions. The first question relates to the
application of the jurisprudence as developed to date. The second question
considers the relevance of the Crown's fiduciary obligations in the context
of a constitutional amendment to facilitate the secession of Quebec. The
third question is whether or not a constitutional amendment that would
facilitate the secession of Quebec with its present provincial boundaries
would be lawful if it was obtained without the consent of the Aboriginal
peoples of Ungava.
a. The scope of the fiduciary obligation as defined by jurisprudence
The fiduciary obligation owed to the Aboriginal peoples deriving
from Aboriginal treaty rights does not prevent a government from
overriding those rights in certain circumstances. Prior to the introduction
of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, these rights, because they did not
have constitutional status, could be overridden by legislation on the basis
of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 132 The constitutional
requirement placed upon federal and provincial parliaments by section 35
does limit their capacity to override Aboriginal or treaty rights. The
limitations only relate to rights that existed on April 17, 1982, the date on
which section 35 came into effect.13
3
In Sparrow, the Court observed that such surviving Aboriginal rights
are not absolute and that the Crown has the legislative power to override
these rights. However, overriding legislation would only be valid if "it meets
the test for justifying an interference with a right recognized and affirmed
under subsection 35(1).' ' 4 As the Court observed, the incorporation of
131 Ibid. at 782.
132 R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at 538 [Van der Peet]; Marshall, supra note 125 at 496.
13 3 Sparrow, supra note 95 at 1091.
13 4 Ibid. at 1109.
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fiduciary obligations by subsection 35(1) meant that "federal power must
be reconciled with federal duty and the best way to achieve that
reconciliation is to demand the justification of any government regulation
that infringes upon or denies Aboriginal rights.,
135
In Sparrow, the Court established the test to determine whether the
Crown has fulfilled its fiduciary obligations when legislation that affects
Aboriginal rights is passed. The test asks the following three questions:
1.Are there existing Aboriginal or treaty rights?
2. Has there been a prima facie infringement of those rights?
3. Can the infringement be justified? 136
In R. v. Gladstone, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 considered the second
question and set a low threshold for infringement: "The only thing that the
claimant must show is that, on its face, the legislation comes into conflict
with a recognized aboriginal right, either because of its object or its
effects."'
137
The question of justification, however, is more complicated,
necessitating a two-step analysis. In Delgamuukw,138 the Court required the
government first to establish that the infringement of the Aboriginal right
was "in furtherance of a legislative objective that is compelling and
substantial." '139 The Court held the second part of the justification process
"requires an assessment of whether the infringement is consistent with the
special fiduciary relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples."14
An important feature of such an assessment is consultation with the
relevant Aboriginal peoples.
InDelgamuukw, the Court also addressed, at length, the nature and
scope of the duty to consult. Chief Justice Lamer stated, "[t]here is always
a duty of consultation. [...] The nature and scope of the duty of
consultation will vary with the circumstances. [...] Some cases may [...]
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid. at 1111-19.
137 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 at 810. In Sparrow, supra note 95 at 1112, the Court held that the
infringement test included a further three-part test: (i) is the limitation reasonable; (ii) does it impose
undue hardship; and (iii) does it deny the right holders the preferred means of exercising their rights?
This aspect of the infringement test has been subsequently rejected in favour of the quoted statement
from Gladstone. See Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2002] 1
C.N.L.R. 169 (F.C.T.D.).
13 8 Delgamuukw, supra note 127.
139Ibid. at 1107.
140 Ibid. at 1108.
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require the full consent of an aboriginal nation, particularly when provinces
enact hunting and fishing regulations in relation to aboriginal lands."14' In
Marshall, the Court ruled that the same justificatory test applied to both
Aboriginal rights and treaty rights. 4
In summary, the JBNQA imposes fiduciary obligations upon both the
federal and the Quebec governments.'43 The practical implication of such
fiduciary obligations is that when legislation interferes with the rights of the
Aboriginal parties to the JBNQA, the Crown must comply with its fiduciary
obligation to consult with the Aboriginal peoples in accordance with
Sparrow.
b. Fiduciary obligations and a constitutional amendment
Although it is clear that the Sparrow test is relevant in the context
of federal or provincial legislation that affects existing Aboriginal or treaty
rights, such as fishing, hunting, and trapping, it must be established that the
same principles apply to a proposed constitutional amendment that affects
Aboriginal or treaty rights. This is an important issue if, as will be analyzed
below, a Quebec secession amendment is one that affects Aboriginal or
treaty rights.
Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 sets out various procedures for
amending Canada's constitution, depending on the nature of the
amendment. None of these procedures stipulate a justification test along
the lines set out in Sparrow. Section 35.1 of the Constitution Act, 1982
requires that a constitutional conference be convened in relation to
amendments to subsection 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 or sections
25, 35, and 35.1 of the Constitution Act, 1982. More significantly, section
35.1 stipulates that representatives of Canada's Aboriginal peoples be
invited to participate in discussions at such a conference. However, the
requirements of section 35.1 fall short of the justification principles in
Sparrow in that all that is required is the participation of Aboriginal
representatives in the constitutional conference.
Furthermore, section 35.1 may preclude any involvement of
Aboriginal peoples, especially those of Ungava, in a constitutional
amendment effecting the secession of Quebec even if such an amendment
141 Ibid. at 1113.
142 Marshall, supra note 125 at 505. For a critical evaluation of Marshall on this point see Leonard
Rotman, "Marshalling Principles From the Marshall Morass" (2000) 23 Dal. L.J. 5 at 41-46.
143 On provincial fiduciary obligations see Leonard Ian Rotman,Parallel Paths: Fiduciary Doctrine
and the Crown-Native Relationship in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) at 241-43,
251-54 [Rotman, Parallel Paths].
[VOL. 41, No. 4
Territorial Scope of an Independent Quebec
affects Aboriginal or treaty rights. However, for this to be so, one must first
accept the argument that section 35.1 sets out the only circumstances that
require the involvement of Aboriginal peoples and that in no other cases
of constitutional amendment do they have a role to play. On this basis, it
could be argued that a Quebec secession amendment, not being an
amendment to the four constitutional provisions set out in section 35.1, can
be adopted without any Aboriginal involvement or consent. However, such
a conclusion cannot be sustained for a number of reasons.
First, as Peter Hogg has stated, the fact that section 35.1 does not
apply to all constitutional amendments does not exclude the application of
the Sparrow justification test to all constitutional amendments that affect
Aboriginal treaty rights.' Hogg does not explain in detail why the
justification rules in Sparrow would apply to constitutional amendments
that affect Aboriginal or treaty rights. However, it is simply illogical for the
Sparrow rules not to apply because Aboriginal or treaty rights are being
affected by a constitutional amendment rather than ordinary federal or
provincial legislation. It is illogical to argue that the Sparrow rules do not
apply to the former but do to the latter. Notwithstanding the fundamental
nature of a constitution, it is in essence no different than ordinary
legislative acts passed by a state. In the Canadian setting, both the
constitution and ordinary legislative acts create rights and obligations that
are capable of being changed. It is only with the prerequisites for changes
that there is a difference between the two. The constitution, because of its
centrality and importance, is more difficult to change than ordinary
legislation. In the latter case, a simple parliamentary majority suffices
unless that ordinary legislation affects existing Aboriginal and treaty rights.
In such cases the legislation must satisfy the justification principles set out
in Sparrow. That a constitutional amendment that affects Aboriginal or
treaty rights needs to satisfy the more demanding procedure in Part V of
the Constitution Act, 1982, is not reason enough to dispense with the
justification rules in Sparrow because none of the Part V requirements
relate to consulting with or obtaining the consent of Aboriginal peoples. If
ordinary legislation affecting Aboriginal or treaty rights must conform with
the Sparrow test, it is illogical to exempt amendments to Canada's
constitution that affect Aboriginal and treaty rights from the same
justification tests.
A second reason why section 35.1 does not exclude the Sparrow
rules in cases of constitutional amendments that affect Aboriginal or treaty
rights is that given by the Court in Secession Reference:
144 Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 94 at 27-46.
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The "promise" of s. 35 [of the Constitution Act, 1982], as it was termed inR. v. Sparrow [...],
recognized not only the ancient occupation of land by Aboriginal peoples, but their
contribution to the building of Canada, and the special commitments made to them by
successive governments. The protection of these rights, so recently and arduously achieved,
whether looked at in their own right or as part of the larger concern with minorities, reflects
an important underlying constitutional value) 45
This passage makes it difficult to sustain the view that a constitutional
amendment that affects Aboriginal or treaty rights could be adopted
without compliance with the Sparrow justification principles. To suggest
otherwise would render meaningless the Court's ruling that Aboriginal
rights reflect "an important underlying constitutional value."
Thus, on the basis of the above arguments, the Sparrow principles
apply to any constitutional amendment that affects Aboriginal or treaty
rights and, therefore, section 35.1 of the Constitution Act, 1982 cannot be
construed to exclude the application of these principles in this context.
c. Application of fiduciary obligations to a secession amendment
Although it is clear that the Sparrow principles apply to a
constitutional amendment that affects Aboriginal rights, their practical
application to a constitutional amendment creating an independent Quebec
is not clear, especially if Quebec were to retain its current borders. The
difficulty of the application resides in the third Sparrow question; however,
I shall treat each question as it relates to the Aboriginal peoples in Ungava.
i. Are there existing Aboriginal or treaty rights?
In light of the discussion in Part IV, above, it is clear that the JBNQA
creates treaty rights held by the Aboriginal people in Ungava.
ii. Has there been a prima facie infringement of those rights?
The Crown's fiduciary obligations towards the Aboriginal peoples
are only relevant if the secession of Quebec would affect their Aboriginal
or treaty rights. If Ungava were to remain part of an independent Quebec,
Aboriginal rights under the JBNQA would dramatically be affected. Under
the agreement, Aboriginal rights were surrendered to and accepted by both
Canada and Quebec. Accordingly, the benefits granted to the Aboriginal
peoples by the agreement require the involvement of both Quebec and
Canada. The creation of an independent Quebec within its present
Secession Reference, supra note 8 at 262-63.
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provincial borders would automatically prevent Canada from fulfilling its
fiduciary obligations under the JBNQA 16 and from fulfilling the "special
responsibility" referred to in the preamble to the federal legislation
implementing the JBNQA.'47
It may be that the secession of Quebec within its present territory
would not impact Aboriginal rights if, as a condition of secession, the new
Quebec government constitutionally entrenched all relevant Aboriginal
rights by replicating present Canadian constitutional guarantees in its own
constitution. Thus, there would be no infringement of Aboriginal rights.
Although this argument has superficial appeal, closer scrutiny
reveals its deficiencies. The JBNQA was negotiated in the context of a
federal political structure. As it makes no provision for the fulfilment of
Canada's obligations in the event of secession, it is reasonable to conclude
that all parties entered into the agreement assuming the continued
existence of such a federal structure.'48 Aboriginal people of Ungava would
have negotiated distinctly different terms had Quebec been independent.'49
The importance of the federal structure to the Aboriginal parties to the
JBNQA is stressed by Bradford Morse: "The simple presence of federalism
provides some semblance of added protection to Aboriginal peoples, as
there are two levels of government in place, thereby increasing the
possibility that at least one level of government might advance their
interests despite limited electoral or economic influence.,'
' 50
Leaving the rights granted by the JBNQA to its Aboriginal
signatories to be protected by a (presumably) unitary Quebec would greatly
increase the risk that such rights could subsequently be abrogated, even if
these rights were constitutionally entrenched in an independent Quebec's
constitution. Amendment of such a constitution would not be as difficult as
amending the present Canadian constitution with its requirement of both
federal and provincial support for any amendment. Even if a veto in favour
of Aboriginal peoples were entrenched in the constitution of an
146 Makivik Factum, supra note 5 at paras. 76-78.
147 It would also be inconsistent with the very essence of the trust-like nature of the fiduciary
relationship. On equitable fiduciary relationship principles it is almost certainly the case because in the
present context only the Aboriginal peoples of Ungava could terminate the fiduciary relationship
between themselves and the federal government. See Rotman, Parallel Paths, supra note 143 at 257;
Hogg, "Secession of Quebec", supra note 83 at 44.
148 Hogg, "Secession of Quebec", ibid. at 44.
149 Makivik Factum, supra note 5 at para. 59. Grand Council of the Crees, supra note 4 at 278-79;
Cree Factum, supra note 5 at paras. 56-59.
150 Bradford Morse, "How Would Quebec's Secession Affect Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal
Rights?" (1999) 11 N.J.C.L. 107 at 122.
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independent Quebec, their Aboriginal and treaty rights would inevitably be
interpreted differently because the context of a unitary Quebec constitution
would be markedly different from the existing federal constitution of
Canada. 51 An integral part of the rights of the Aboriginal parties to the
JBNQA is the very strength of the constitutional protections they have
because of the difficulties in amending Canada's federal constitution.152
Thus, transferring such rights to a constitutional structure that is inherently
easier to amend becomes an infringement of those rights.
iii. Can the infringement be justified?
Assuming that a constitutional amendment transferring
responsibility for the Aboriginal rights of the people in Ungava to a
unitarian Quebec government infringes those rights, for the amendment to
be legal the infringement must still be justified.153
The first element of justification is that the infringement must be
in furtherance of a legislative object that is compelling and substantial. 5 4
A sufficiently strong vote at a referendum in Quebec in favour of secession
would give rise to a compelling and substantial legislative object. This much
can be inferred from the fact that the Secession Reference requires
commencement of constitutional negotiations for an amendment in the
event of such a vote. 55 However, whether or not the compelling and
substantial legislative object is the independence of Quebec within its
present borders is open to doubt. Rather, it can be argued that there would
be a compelling and substantial legislative object with respect to those parts
of Quebec where support for secession was clear. On the assumption that
the Aboriginal population of Ungava voted against secession, Ungava
would not be included in the legislative object on the basis that opposition
to secession of Quebec would "challenge the legitimacy of the Quebec
government claiming a mandate for sovereignty that would automatically
include [Ungava's Aboriginal] peoples.', 56 Thus, by not satisfying the first
part of the justification test, a constitutional amendment to facilitate the
secession of Quebec within its present provincial borders could not succeed.
151 Grand Council of the Crees, supra note 4 at 279.
152 Sheppard, supra note 5 at 852.
153 See notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
154 Delgamuukw, supra note 127.
155 See notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
156 Alan C. Cairns, "Why Is It So Difficult to Talk to Each Other?" (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 63 at
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Furthermore, even if there was compliance with the first part of the
justification test, the infringement of Aboriginal or treaty rights must also
be consistent with the special fiduciary relationship that exists between the
Crown and Aboriginal peoples. As previously noted, this element involves
the requirement of consultation or in some cases, as was pointed out in
Delgamuukw, "the full consent"'57 of the relevant Aboriginal peoples.
The departure of Ungava from Canada may pose such a serious
infringement of Aboriginal or treaty rights that it would come within the
category of infringements that require the full consent of the Aboriginal
parties to the JBNQA before the second element described in Delgamuuk,
could be satisfied. Such a departure would, as already noted, excuse
Canada's federal government from its obligations under the JBNQA.
However, the federal government cannot be excused from its obligations
without the consent of the Aboriginal parties to the JBNQA. The JBNQA
itself requires such consent in section 2.15, which states that any changes to
the JBNQA must be approved by all parties to it.'58
Therefore, the independence of Quebec within the scope of its
present provincial borders can be achieved only with the consent of the
Aboriginal parties to the JBNQA to the appropriate constitutional
amendment. Without such consent a constitutional amendment effecting
secession would be invalid and illegitimate.
C. The Nature of Canadian Federalism
The third basis on which it can be argued that Quebec cannot
justifiably achieve independence within the scope of its present provincial
borders is based on the principle of Canadian federalism. The federal
principle, which is one of the underlying principles that "inform and sustain
the constitutional text,' '159 requires more than mere compliance with Part
V of the Constitution Act, 1982 in the creation of constitutional
amendments that affect Aboriginal or treaty rights. In Reference Re
Resolution to Amend the Constitution60 the Court stated, "[t]he federal
principle cannot be reconciled with a state of affairs where the modification
of provincial legislative powers could be obtained by the unilateral action
of the federal authorities.' '61 By analogy, it is impossible to reconcile this
157 Delgamuukw, supra note 127 at 1113.
158 Makivik Factum, supra note 5 at para. 64.
159 Secession Reference, supra note 8 at 247.
160 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753.
161 Ibid. at 905-906.
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federal principle with an amendment to Canada's constitution by the
unilateral action of federal and provincial authorities where such an
amendment has the effect of modifying existing Aboriginal or treaty rights.
In effect, Canada's Aboriginal peoples form a third tier within Canada's
federal system. 62
The Court has consistently recognized that one purpose of
subsection 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982 is to reconcile the sovereignty
of the Crown with the sovereign rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada
who lived as "independent nations and political communities"'63 before
European settlement of the continent. Thus, in R. v. Van der Peet164 the
Court's majority said,
[T]he doctrine of Aboriginal rights exists, and is recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1), because
of one simple fact: when Europeans arrived in North America, Aboriginal peoples were
already here, living in communities on the land, and participating in distinctive cultures, as
they had done for centuries. It is this fact, and this fact above all others, which separates
Aboriginal peoples from all other minority groups in Canadian society and which mandates
their special legal, and now constitutional, status.
More specifically, what s. 35(1) does is provide the constitutional framework through which
the fact that Aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their own practices,
traditions and cultures, is acknowledged and reconciled with the sovereignty of the Crown.
The substantive rights which fall within the provision must be defined in light of this purpose;
the Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) must be directed towards the
reconciliation of the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the
Crown. 6 '
Subsection 35(1) recognizes the sovereignty of the Aboriginal
peoples prior to European settlement of North America and affirms the
continued existence of such sovereignty after such settlement, albeit in a
diminished form. This Aboriginal sovereignty also survived the process of
Confederation in 1867. The distribution of legislative power between
federal and provincial governments pursuant to sections 91 and 92 of the
Constitution Act, 1867 was not exhaustive in the sense that there remained
no other competent legislative authority. Rather, sections 91 and 92 simply
distributed, between federal and provincial authorities, such legislative
competence as was enjoyed prior to 1867 by colonial authorities within
162 Morse refers to Aboriginal peoples as "constitutional entities": Morse, supra note 149 at 111.
On the issue of native Americans amounting to a third tier in the federal structure of the United States
of America see Carol Tebben, "An American Trifederalism Based upon the Constitutional Status of
Tribal Nations" (2003) 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 318.
163 Campbellv. British Columbia (A. G.) (2000), 189 D.L.R. (4th) 333 at 357 (B.C.S.C.) [Campbell].
164 Van der Peet, supra note 132.
165 Ibid. at 538-39.
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British North America. 166 Any other legislative competence, including that
belonging to Aboriginal peoples, remained untouched.1
67
In Campbell, Justice Williamson held that any Aboriginal legislative
competence that survived the European settlement of Canada was
constitutionally guaranteed by subsection 35(1).68 To a large extent this
entrenchment was justified by the principle of the rule of law and
constitutionalism set out by the Court in the Secession Reference. In
particular the Court referred to the need for a constitution "to ensure that
vulnerable minority groups are endowed with the institutions and rights
necessary to maintain and promote their identities against assimilative
pressures of the majority. 169
The constitutionalization of Aboriginal rights in subsection 35(1)
gives rise to a form of shared sovereignty between the Crown and
Aboriginal peoples. In the Court decision of Mitchell v. M.N.R.,17° Justices
Major and Binnie expressed support for a view that "sees Aboriginal
peoples as full participants with non-Aboriginal peoples in a shared
Canadian sovereignty. Aboriginal peoples do not stand in opposition to,
nor are they subjugated by, Canadian sovereignty. They are part of it.' 171
The reconciliation of Crown sovereignty and Aboriginal sovereignty is, as
stated in Van der Peet, one of the central purposes of subsection 35(1). As
stated in Delgamuukw, the preferred means to achieve this integration is
through negotiated treaty settlements.172 Such treaties are accorded the
constitutional protection of subsection 35(1).1 3
Therefore, just as constitutional amendments affecting provincial
legislative powers are not legal without provincial support, a constitutional
amendment that affects or modifies Aboriginal rights is not legal without
the support of affected Aboriginal peoples. A constitutional amendment to
effect Quebec's secession would clearly affect the sovereign rights of
Ungava's Aboriginal peoples and, therefore, would require their consent
for it to be legally adopted. In effect, the necessity of support of the
166 Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver-General of New Brunswick, [1892] A.C.
437 at 441-42.
167 Campbell, supra note 163 at 352-53.
168 Ibid. at 366-68.
169 Secession Reference, supra note 8 at 259.
170 [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911.
171 Ibid. at 980-81. See Cree Factum, supra note 5 at para. 23; and see Brian Slattery, "First
Nations and the Constitution: A Question of Trust" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 261 at 272.
172 Delgamuukw, supra note 127 at 1123-24
173 Campbell, supra note 163 at 376.
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Aboriginal peoples to such an amendment is critical to the justification of
a secession amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
If Canada is ever required to hold a conference for the purposes of
negotiating a constitutional amendment to facilitate the secession of
Quebec, a critical issue will be that of an independent Quebec's territory
and borders. This is particularly true in relation to Ungava, which accounts
for approximately two-thirds of Quebec. Given that the Aboriginal peoples
of Ungava want to remain in Canada in the event of Quebec's
independence, this article has suggested three constitutional bases
preventing Quebec from insisting that its current provincial borders be
transformed into international borders.
First, even though Quebec's provincial borders are constitutionally
protected and cannot be altered without its consent, such protection exists
only for as long as Quebec remains part of Canada. Given that the purpose
of Quebec's territorial expansion, under the 1912 border legislation, was
the development of Quebec as a province within Canada, Quebec would be
required to relinquish its claim to the territory acquired in 1912 if it chose
to secede. If the 1898 legislation had the effect of extending Quebec's
territorial scope, a similar relinquishment would be required.
Second, the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty
rights by subsection 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 and the
consequential fiduciary obligations owed by the Crown to the Aboriginal
parties to the JBNQA requires the approval of these parties to any
constitutional amendment affecting their rights. A secession of Quebec
would affect Aboriginal treaty rights under the JBNQA. Any negotiated
constitutional amendment stipulating that Quebec's current provincial
borders become international borders would be illegal if it did not have, in
accordance with the justification principles set out in Sparrow, the approval
of the Aboriginal parties to the JBNQA.' 7 4 These Aboriginal parties to the
JBNQA have signaled their desire to remain within Canada. Therefore, for
Quebec to gain independence, the necessary constitutional amendment also
partitions Quebec.
Finally, the principle of federalism requires the Aboriginal peoples,
as an effective third sovereign tier in Canada's federal structure, to consent
174 It is suggested that in the event that Quebec's Aboriginal peoples and the government of
Quebec were in agreement as to Quebec seceding within the territorial scope of its present provincial
borders the federal government's consent would be required on the basis that the JBNQA requires the
consent of all of its parties to any alterations to it.
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to any constitutional amendment that would affect this sovereignty. Such
consent is not likely to be granted in the current climate of Aboriginal
hostility towards Quebec secession without partitioning the province and
allowing Ungava to remain with Canada.
Thus, although Quebec has consistently and vigorously maintained
its claim to its existing provincial borders, in the event of its secession from
Canada, this claim cannot be sustained under Canadian constitutional law.
From this perspective, Quebec's position is aptly summarized by the words
of Mick Jagger and Keith Richards: "You can't always get what you
want."
175
175 Song by Rolling Stones, "You Can't Always Get What You Want", Let it Bleed (1969).
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